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ABSTRACT 
 
 Wind energy is one of the fastest growing sources of renewable energy in the 
United States, particularly in the Great Plains region. This remarkable expansion has 
been attributed to high social acceptance, a simple permitting system, renewable 
portfolio standards, and tax incentives. However, the extent of financial benefits of wind 
energy (royalties) to landowners is poorly known, and scholars have not yet estimated 
how royalties are distributed spatially. This research utilizes land parcel information in 
conjunction with County Appraisal District records for Nolan and Taylor Counties in 
west Texas; wind turbine (n = 1,746) location, name and nameplate capacity; and a 
royalty estimation. The research examines the spatial distribution of royalties, to 
compare local and absentee benefits, and to estimate the disparity in estimated royalty 
payments between landowners with turbines and those without who receive no direct 
financial benefits. The mean estimated royalty payment per turbine per year is $7,404 
and total royalties for the wind-farms in the two counties is more than $11 million 
annually which is captured by approximately 3% of all rural landowners. Non-resident 
landowners with turbines, defined as those landowners who live more than twenty miles 
from their tax addresses (approximately 46% of total landowners), receive 47% of total 
royalties, with the majority (70%) of royalties received by non-residents in Texas, and 
61% of royalties remaining in the two-county study area. When key components of the 
wind contract depress, the total mean estimated average royalty for the study site also 
depresses, with capacity factor having the most effect on royalties. More than 30% of 
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landowners with turbines have some land tenure in effect, and 45% of royalties are 
distributed to this faction. Turbines, and therefore, royalties appear to be distributed 
unequally amongst rural landowners and parcel size is highly correlated to number of 
turbines and royalty payments. Many residents continue to welcome wind power despite 
the inequality of benefits, but more research is needed to determine what factors may 
affect public perceptions and how royalties may affect spending in the area. Future 
research should focus on how royalties are used.   
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
US United States 
KW Kilowatts 
KWh Kilowatt hours 
MW Megawatts 
MWh Megawatt hours 
GW Gigawatts 
GWh Gigawatt hours 
CF Capacity Factor 
NIMBY/PIMBY ‘Not In My Back Yard”/”Please In My Back Yard” 
AWEA/WWEA American/World Wind Energy Association 
PTC Production Tax Credit 
RPS Renewable Portfolio Standard 
RES Renewable Energy Standard 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents the topic of wind energy and its benefits, usage, and potential. It 
outlines what is known about wind energy at both the global scale and local scale, and 
identifies the gaps in the literature which will be addressed in this thesis.  
 
Wind energy is an economically and ecologically valuable resource, capable of 
benefitting everyone from an individual to the world, and with an established market on 
all continents and in many places offshore, its value is perceptible.  Modern wind-
generated electricity has its roots in a worldwide objective of reducing carbon emissions 
and concerns about the high cost of fossil fuels, and it has truly thrived in the last decade 
as a socially, economically, and ecologically lucrative source of renewable energy. 
Among the myriad reasons that wind energy has been so successful are its price 
competitiveness with other conventional energy sources such as natural gas, capability 
of producing energy without hazardous byproducts or greenhouse gas emissions, CO2 
emissions reduction, creation and sustainability of jobs, and tax incentives. Moreover, 
various factors may determine the success of a particular wind development including 
public perceptions of wind energy or wind farms, type of benefits offered to residents 
affected by the wind development, and whether energy mandates or standards and 
subsidies from county, state, and federal governments are in effect.        
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Globally, wind energy is produced on land in over 100 countries, and offshore of 
eight countries. The world’s leader in installed capacity is China, which constitutes 
nearly 30% of the global capacity, followed by the US with 18%, Germany with 11%, 
Spain with 7%, and India with 6% (WWEA 2014). Worldwide wind capacity is 
currently 392 Gigawatts (GW), powering approximately seventy million homes. Wind 
energy is the fastest-growing source of energy in the world and it is the largest source of 
electricity in some countries, supplying as much as 20% of total electricity. Still, wind 
energy comprises only 4% of the world’s electricity demand, though it could potentially 
supply more than forty times the current worldwide consumption of electricity (Lu et al. 
2009). Other energy sources are coal, nuclear energy, natural gas, hydroelectricity, 
petroleum, or other renewable energy sources.  In many of the top wind-producing 
countries, wind energy is cost-competitive with natural gas, nuclear power, or 
hydroelectricity.  
In the United States, wind energy has been employed in 39 states as well as 
Puerto Rico, however, the US is only fulfilling a fraction of its vast wind potential. At 
maximum capacity on land and offshore, wind could supply enough electricity to power 
the US thirteen times over (AWEA 2014). Though only 4% of total electrical energy in 
the United States is supplied by wind power, 32% of renewable energy is wind-
generated. In the past decade alone, the US wind industry has experienced exponential 
growth in terms of installed capacity, rocketing from around 6,600 Megawatts (MW) in 
2004 to 61,300 MW in 2014 (AWEA 2014), enough to power approximately 15.5 
million homes. This remarkable expansion of wind energy in the Great Plains has 
3 
 
occurred on mainly private landholdings as a result of high social acceptance, aggressive 
building campaigns, tax incentives and subsidy programs such as the Federal Production 
Tax Credit (PTC), and cost-effectiveness relative to electricity derived from coal, 
nuclear power, or natural gas (Bohn and Lant 2009). Texas is the US leader in installed 
capacity with 12,755 MW, more than California and Iowa combined, and has a capacity 
of more than one-fifth of the national capacity. Texas ranks second, after California, for 
number of wind turbines installed, and is home to six of the ten largest wind farms in the 
US. The largest wind farm in Texas is the Roscoe Wind Farm, which is located in Nolan 
County, and has a capacity of 781.5 MW from 634 turbines.           
Development of wind energy has been crucial in the United States and globally 
to reduce carbon emissions by reducing reliance on coal-burning power plants. 
Moreover, wind energy has increased economic activity in otherwise declining 
communities in the form of construction, operation and maintenance, and royalty 
payments to landowners. Although scholars have begun to analyze employment impacts 
of wind-power development, little is known about the destination and distribution of 
royalty payments. The actual impact of royalties on communities supporting wind farms 
is therefore also not known, nor is the total of non-resident landowners collecting 
royalties. This research will address the issue of distribution of royalties from a spatial 
perspective to assess the financial status of the study sites in central Texas. In most 
instances, turbines are sited on private property; more than 90% of US wind capacity is 
on private land. To compensate landowners for the use of the land to accommodate a 
turbine or several turbines, wind firms may offer a land rent or royalty. Generally, an 
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ideal piece of land for a turbine would be in a rural location with an area of several 
hectares, a suitable wind resource, access to existing electrical transmission lines, and 
adjacent to similar parcels so that an array of turbines could be installed. If a particular 
property meets these criteria, a contract is negotiated between a wind operator and a 
landowner for the use of the land and payment of royalties for a period of twenty years 
or more. Long-term contracts are offered by wind firms in order to recuperate the cost of 
the original investment of the wind turbine, which is usually between $1 and $2 million 
per MW at the commercial scale. Only a handful of scholars have approximated the 
amount in royalties generated by wind energy, which is estimated to be around $5,000 
per turbine per year (Pasqualetti 2004; Sowers 2006; Pasqualetti 2011; Ellis 2012), but 
this amount varies with the actual amount of electricity generated (i.e. the Capacity 
Factor or CF), the royalty rate offered by the wind firm, and the wholesale price of 
energy per Megawatt hour (MWh).        
Nolan County and its eastern neighbor Taylor County in west Texas offer an 
ideal case study for analysis of the value of wind energy because they are home to the 
Roscoe Wind Farm, the Horse Hollow Wind Energy Center, the Sweetwater Wind Farm, 
and the Buffalo Gap Wind Farm, four of the five largest wind farms in Texas. Many 
studies have been conducted in this area; some about the social perspectives of wind 
energy (Brannstrom et al. 2011; Slattery et al. 2012; Jepson et al. 2012; Kahn 2013) or 
its political intricacies (Fischlein et al. 2010; Jepson et al. 2012), and considerably more 
on wind’s economic impacts (New Amsterdam 2008; Slattery et al. 2011; Blair 2012; 
Kahn 2013). A great deal is known about the social perspectives of wind energy in this 
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area, specifically residents’ opinions about wind energy, wind farms, wind turbines, and 
economic benefits (Brannstrom et al. 2011). Non-peer-reviewed studies have ventured 
into the realm of estimating the economic benefits of wind energy in the form of 
employment and wind royalties (New Amsterdam 2008; Blair 2012), though these 
studies are scarce. Employment benefits are definite and perceptible, however, wind 
royalties are not as distinct in terms of how much is actually paid to a landowner in 
rents, and where the royalties are actually being spatially distributed.  Despite the 
extensive literature on the social and economic impacts of wind energy, no studies to 
date have considered royalty distribution to be a spatial problem. This could be 
attributed to the difficulties in “tracking” money. Therefore, this research “follows the 
money” to the land owner; however, no attempt is made to understand how landowners 
use their royalties. The present study addresses the gap in knowledge about spatial 
distribution of royalties to landowners and the effects of the alteration of contract terms 
on royalty amounts, and aims to investigate the socioeconomic impacts and wind energy 
potential within the study area. 
This research has two areas of intellectual merit. First, Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) modeling of the spatial distribution of royalties will help scholars 
understand the economic impacts of wind energy. It is still unknown how royalties 
generated from wind turbines are spatially distributed, how those distributions affect 
economic activity, whether some land use types are more desirable than others in siting 
decisions, and whether the alteration of relevant variables (wind turbines, contract term, 
and turbine output) significantly affects the distribution of royalties. Scholars have 
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estimated the approximate amount in royalties paid to landowners (Slattery et al. 2011), 
the social perspectives of county residents (Brannstrom et al. 2011), and some have even 
made associations between economic returns and acceptance of wind farms, such as 
public support increasing when monetary benefits become apparent, or that residents 
support wind energy because of lease payments (Pasqualetti 2001; Sowers 2006). This 
research will fill the knowledge gap in how wind energy affects landowners 
economically and whether specific variables significantly affect royalty distribution. 
Nolan and Taylor Counties encompass a land area of 474,744 hectares with some 
small cities and towns in the north, and the metropolitan area of Abilene in northeast 
Taylor County. The topography is mainly flat with some rolling hills and valleys. 
Including an abundant wind supply, many of these attributes are what make this rural 
area so attractive to wind developers. Land uses for rural areas in Nolan and Taylor are 
mainly ranch- and farmland, yielding cotton, wheat, sorghum, and hay production, as 
well as orchards. According to the US Department of Agriculture’s Census, 188,243 
hectares of Nolan County and 234,277 hectares of Taylor County are farmland (USDA 
2012), which translates to 80% of Nolan County and 98% of Taylor County being 
farmland. The USDA census defines “farmland” as “any place from which $1,000 or 
more of agricultural products were produced and sold…during the census year” (USDA 
2012), which indicates that farms and ranches are synonymous. There are 1,149 farms in 
Taylor County, and 478 farms in Nolan County, all producing some crop and/or 
livestock for sale. Wind developers are particularly attracted to farming and ranching 
land uses because wind energy can help boost the local economy and offset some 
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farming costs (Sowers 2006). Abbott (2010) affirms that “farm production and wind 
power can coexist to increase the economic productivity of rural landscapes. Wind 
power can occur coincident with farming activities, such as ranging livestock or 
cultivating field crops. The steady and predictable revenue that turbines provide can 
close the gap on relatively volatile farm rents.”  
This research begins with a literature review chapter, which encompasses the 
relevant observations from previous literature, how they correspond to the three 
dimensions of wind energy literature (the social, public policy, and socio-economic 
dimensions), and how they relate to the knowledge gap addressed in this thesis. The next 
chapter identifies the data sources and analytical methods used to determine the 
estimated spatial distribution of royalties for wind energy at the study site.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF WIND ENERGY 
 
This chapter identifies prior wind energy research and relates relevant observations from 
those studies to each of the three dimensions of wind energy: Social, Socio-economic, 
and Public Policy.   
 
II.1 The social dimension 
II. 1. A. Acceptance/Opposition 
One of the leading disputes over wind energy is the social acceptability of wind 
farms. Many researchers claim that one of the highest barriers to the implementation of 
wind energy is public acceptance (Bell et al. 2005; Sowers 2006; Devine-Wright 2007; 
Aitken 2009; Molina-Ruiz et al. 2011). Wind energy has been fervently protested in 
many communities because of noise, aesthetics, and avian mortality. Nevertheless, a 
number of studies have shown that public attitudes toward wind energy are very high 
(Krohn and Damborg 1999; Pasqualetti 2001; Rodman and Meentemeyer 2006; 
Brannstrom et al. 2011; Cowell et al. 2011;). However, the reasons behind positive 
public attitudes and social acceptability are variable and complex. Sowers (2006) asserts 
that residents allow and accept turbines because of their financial benefits. Conversely, 
Cowell et al. (2011) suggest that community benefits are the cause of acceptance rather 
than the effect. Swofford and Slattery (2010) claim that environmental benefits drive 
public support as opposed to climate change and use of fossil fuels. Cowell et al. (2011) 
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suggest an array of factors, ranging from “community benefits” to landscape value, have 
a bearing on people’s stance towards development. In the case of “community benefits,” 
residents affected by development of wind farms can be compensated for the 
inconvenience of having a network of turbines nearby. In addition to compensation, 
some residents may also be granted control over the terms of the development and be 
allowed active participation in the development process; however, this does not 
necessarily guarantee the residents’ acceptance of the network of turbines.  
Public opinion of wind energy is one of the primary concerns of wind energy 
firms in the development of wind farms worldwide because the affected community has 
the potential to bar a project through political or judicial means. If a proposed wind farm 
meets considerable opposition during the planning phase, the project may never undergo 
construction. Likewise, if a proposed project is highly supported, it may potentially 
proceed through the various stages of development more quickly. Alternatively, active 
opposition may have no effect on the proposed development. On the other hand, as Bell 
et al. (2005, 2013) theorized, there may be what is termed a “democratic deficit”, 
wherein the majority of people are in favor of wind energy, but a particular development 
is opposed by a vocal minority who oppose wind power, and the outcome does not 
reflect the will of the majority. According to Bell et al. (2005), “the potential of 
opponents to block wind power developments is likely to be greater if they fit a 
particular educational and socio-economic profile that enables them to operate more 
effectively in the political arena”. Some communities may be more successful in their 
attempts to block or delay a development than others, as was the case with the Nantucket 
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Sound Cape Wind project, where it was established that the better resourced the 
opposition is economically, legally, and technically, the more likely to succeed (Bohn 
and Lant 2009; Firestone et al. 2009; Bell et al. 2013).  Nevertheless, most people who 
support wind energy do not support it without hesitation (Wolsink 2000; Bell et al. 2005; 
Sowers 2006; Wolsink 2007; Bell et al. 2013; Mulvaney et al. 2013). Some believe wind 
energy is good in theory, but when implemented has its limits and faults; others believe 
that it can be detrimental to the landscape, wildlife, and humans. Public attitudes toward 
wind energy have also been found to vary throughout the stages of construction, from 
high acceptance before construction to lower acceptance during construction, and then 
high acceptance again after construction (Wolsink 1989; Gipe 1995; Krohn and 
Damborg 1999; Pasqualetti 2001; Devine-Wright 2005; van der Horst 2007; Wolsink 
2007; Wüstenhagen et al. 2007; Warren and McFadyen 2010; Groth and Vogt 2014). 
Another factor affecting acceptance or opposition to a wind farm is the level of 
education about turbines, wind energy and wind farms the public possesses (Krohn and 
Damborg 1999; Bell et al. 2005; Devine-Wright 2005; Aitken 2009; Sovacool and Ratan 
2012). Improved public understanding about wind-power is beneficial, but it does not 
necessarily guarantee acceptance of the project. According to Bell et al. (2005), the more 
informed the affected residents, the more likely they are to accept a wind project and the 
availability, accessibility, and comprehensibility of the information are crucial to 
achieving this end. Conversely, Wolsink (2007) suggested that though improving public 
knowledge of wind energy is always beneficial, it will not likely change attitudes. 
Likewise, the level of education achieved by the public has been linked to acceptance or 
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opposition to a wind development along with demographic data such as socioeconomic 
status, gender, and age (Thayer and Freeman 1987; van der Horst and Toke 2010; Bell et 
al.2013; Mulvaney et al. 2013). An early study conducted by Thayer and Freeman in 
1987 showed that in general, positive attitudes about wind energy were held by females, 
older citizens, and those whose highest education level achieved was a high school 
diploma. On the other hand, Mulvaney et al. (2013) were unable to find any significant 
demographic factor or pattern triggering acceptance or opposition. Simply defined, Bell 
et al. (2013) contend that protests are more likely to succeed where the community has 
the best resources to do so (i.e. the community fits a socioeconomic and/or demographic 
profile that allows them to operate more efficiently in the political arena). However, 
possessing a certain educational background does not guarantee a successful protest; 
sometimes in the planning process, the community’s protests are not considered 
legitimate because the public does not possess formal expertise in the field of wind 
energy. Aitken (2009) asserts that the public has its own set of credentials and expertise 
(“lay knowledge”) about wind energy developments and dissenting opinions about a 
wind development should not be marginalized due to lack of formal or “expert” 
knowledge. Expert knowledge is deemed incontrovertible in decision-making, creating 
an atmosphere of mistrust between the public and the decision-makers and has potential 
to create more wind protestors.  
According to most scholars, the biggest deterrent to implementation of wind 
energy is aesthetics (Krohn and Damborg 1999; Pasqualetti 2001; Devine-Wright 2005; 
Wolsink 2007; Bohn and Lant 2009; Swofford and Slattery 2010), which encompasses a 
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broad range of visual aspects of a wind farm including but not limited to: the height of 
the turbines, the number of turbines in a wind farm, whether the turbine rotors are 
spinning, the color of turbines, and the geographic location of the wind farm. An 
unfortunate limitation of wind-generated electricity is that the turbines must be sited 
where the wind resource is the greatest. This usually means that turbines are placed in 
highly-visible areas, which may disrupt viewsheds. Many solutions have been proposed 
throughout the years to minimize the ostensible disfigurement of the landscape, 
including painting the turbines a neutral color, reducing the tower height and/or blade 
height, and assorted variations of turbine configurations (Pasqualetti 2004, Devine-
Wright 2005; Wolsink 2007; Pasqualetti 2011). According to Wolsink (2007), clustering 
of turbines into farms is preferable to scattered individual turbines, and smaller farms are 
preferable to massive ones, but the most important factor in wind-power development is 
the landscape on which turbines will be placed. In selected case studies in the United 
Kingdom and Europe, smaller wind farms consisting of fewer than eight turbines were 
found more favorable by residents than scattered solitary turbines and large arrays, and 
fewer large turbines were preferable to numerous smaller turbines (Devine-Wright 
2005). Some residents are even concerned that their property values will decrease as a 
result of wind farm development. A study conducted by Hoen et al. (2011) nevertheless 
determined that there is no evidence that the presence of wind turbines affects property 
values based on scenic area, and nuisance stigmata. As Abbott (2010) points out, 
aesthetics are subjective; some will find turbines to be attractive and others will find 
them blights on the landscape. Nevertheless, “as wind power increases its geographical 
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footprint, multiple factors will inform how people respond to wind farms” (Brannstrom 
et al. 2011).  
One such factor that may affect resident perceptions of wind farms is the sense of 
place identity or place attachment (Pasqualetti 2011). Place identity is the value, 
significance, and meaning of a location based on its inhabitants’ sentiments toward it. 
Strong place identity and place attachment held by residents could be an indicator for 
possible resistance to the proposed wind farm (Devine-Wright and Howes 2010). On the 
other hand, residents have also expressed an increased perception of place identity as a 
result of wind farm construction. Some residents affected by wind farms believe that 
preservation of the landscape should be the top priority with emphasis on conserving the 
viewshed. The landscape may not necessarily have any intrinsic value as a tourist 
attraction, historical site, or scenic vista to be subject to conservation efforts by 
residents. The land holds value for residents because it is their home and they have 
formed an attachment to it, which will have some influence on whether or not a 
particular wind development is deemed acceptable. As Wolsink (2012) points out, 
“attachment to a particular location and the symbolic values of the site to both residents 
and non-residents play a significant role in shaping people’s responses to any proposed 
changes to their surroundings.” Since the geographic, as well as economic, social, and 
political, characteristics of each place are unique, public support will also vary from one 
place to the next. Another emergent belief is that people form a positive bond with the 
landscape over time and perceive that landscape as having greater value than others 
where a development may take place. “Landscape concerns are not simply based on 
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aesthetic or visual appreciation of the landscape, but reflect the experience of living or 
spending time in a particular place” (Bell et al. 2013). Residents who have a strong place 
attachment may feel that wind turbines are a threat to their place identity or that their 
comfort in that place has been interrupted, stemming from a belief that the turbines will 
restructure how residents live.  
II. 1. B. NIMBY/PIMBY 
In the realm of wind energy and many other “noxious” land uses, the concept of 
opposition based on residents who prefer not to have turbines in the immediate vicinity 
is referred to as NIMBYism (Not In My Back Yard). When renewable energy first 
emerged, this seemed to be a popular and convenient way to explain opposition. 
Scholars have explored alternatives to the NIMBY mentality, a common justification for 
opposition to wind energy, which has hitherto been loosely defined and vastly 
oversimplified. NIMBY has been interpreted as acceptance until confronted with the 
prospect of wind farm development in the immediate vicinity after which it is opposed. 
Bell et al. (2005) assert that criticism of NIMBY is warranted because it does not 
adequately “reflect the complexity of human motives and their interaction with social 
and political institutions.” If NIMBY is taken at face value, the opposition to wind farm 
development is purely for personal reasons and those in closer proximity to turbines 
should be expected to express the most opposition, which has not been the case. Krohn 
and Damborg (1999) simplified the results of their surveys in Europe to reflect that 
opposition arose from aesthetic, noise, or interference issues. While it may be true that 
these are just a few of the major contributors in justification of opposition, NIMBY is an 
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inadequate explanation for this behavior. The location of a wind farm with respect to 
residents is an integral part of the study of wind energy, but is by no means the only 
factor that determines opposition. Swofford and Slattery (2010) find that overall, support 
for wind energy is high, although those few residents living within a 5 km radius of a 
farm express equally positive and negative attitudes about wind energy. So incongruous 
was the NIMBY “syndrome,” that numerous scholars expressed their dissent on the 
subject (Wolsink 2000; Bell et al. 2005; Devine-Wright 2005; Aitken 2009; Bohn and 
Lant 2009; Swofford and Slattery 2010; Brannstrom et al. 2011; Bell et al. 2013), with 
the consensus being that NIMBYism does not reflect the complexity of human motives 
and perceptions. The NIMBY theory has been called oversimplified, outdated, unclear, 
inadequate, and even damaging. Additionally, many studies have found that NIMBYism 
is unsubstantiated, and that there seems to be no definite correlation between proximity 
to a wind farm and opposition (Krohn and Damborg 1999; Devine-Wright 2005; Warren 
et al. 2005; Wolsink 2007; Wüstenhagen et al 2007; Devine-Wright and Howes 2010; 
Swofford and Slattery 2010).  
Alternatively, in some instances, development of wind farms is embraced, 
exhibiting a “Please In My Back Yard” (PIMBY) attitude, which more recent studies 
have revealed as an emergent belief (Pasqualetti 2004, Sowers 2006). In the case of 
Sowers’ study, wind farms are accepted because they bring employment and prosperity 
and enhance the local identity. Some scholars indicate that there is a relationship 
between support for wind power and economic returns (Pasqualetti 2001; Sowers 2006), 
but that relationship has not been extensively explored. The theory is that people are 
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more likely to accept wind farms in their back yards because they are profitable in some 
financial, socio-political, or environmental way. Although this attitude seems less 
detrimental to the spectrum of human emotions and motives, it is still deficient with 
respect to cataloguing the reasons for acceptance. While no statistical analysis was 
performed in the case of Sowers’ (2006) research, a qualitative, survey-based approach 
was used to determine social perspectives of wind energy. The issue presented in 
Sowers’ publication is that success of wind farms in one area of the Great Plains in Iowa 
is mostly attributed to residents’ PIMBY attitudes. It is also intimated that financial 
benefits may contribute to positive attitudes. Critics of this attitude emphasize that 
PIMBYism does a disservice to people by assuming that their values can be bought. Bell 
et al (2005) stress the importance of distinguishing between NIMBYism and those 
whose principles are for sale at the right price. Indeed, there is a very fine line between 
compensation for supposed inconveniences and bribes for acceptance; but which is the 
best method for determining if someone’s motives are born from greed and can any 
study truly capture those motives? A middle view is that people desire a return on their 
investments. Consequently, human motivations and perceptions will always be complex 
and difficult to study, even with the aid of statistical methods, and attributing them to 
one simplistic term or another (either NIMBY or PIMBY) is an overgeneralization and 
fails to adequately explicate reasoning for a decision. 
II. 1. C. Socio-political 
The success of wind development at the local scale is heavily dependent on 
socio-political factors such as the public’s relationship to and with the wind developer, 
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the relationship between a landowner with turbines and his neighbor without turbines, or 
the relationship between those opposed to wind farm development and those who are 
unopposed. Many wind projects have failed to reach the construction phase or have 
encountered opposition because of the nature of the decision-making infrastructure, the 
level of trust in the wind corporation or its representatives, or the extent of 
communication between the wind firm and the community about the project. Likewise, 
many projects have succeeded due to the same reasons. Some residents’ opinions about 
wind energy in general or a wind project in particular can also be influenced by 
neighbors, friends, and/or family members. The socio-political aspects of a place are 
complex and challenging to categorize; nevertheless, many scholars have studied the 
effects of social politics on the development process of wind energy (Krohn and 
Damborg 1999; Bell et al. 2005; Devine-Wright 2005; Breukers and Wolsink 2007; 
Wolsink 2007; Wüstenhagen et al. 2007; Bohn and Lant 2009; Devine-Wright and 
Howes 2010; Fischlein et al. 2010; Swofford and Slattery 2010; Wolsink 2010; Cowell 
et al. 2011; Pasqualetti 2011; Wolsink 2012; Groth and Vogt 2014). The socio-political 
aspects in the literature are defined in this research as the governmental and societal 
dynamics between the community and the wind firm. The main issues that arise in the 
socio-political arena are: the degree of trust and/or communication between key actors, 
the decision-making infrastructure, and the level of perceived justice or fairness.    
Communication between key actors is a broad issue, as it encompasses the 
communication between residents in the affected area, stakeholders and those who do 
not benefit directly from the success of wind energy, and the wind firm and residents. 
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Understandably, if communication is poor between the wind firm and residents, an 
environment of mistrust is created. Communication between residents can conceivably 
cause a development to fail if significant opposition is garnered; likewise, a development 
could achieve success if many residents support it. Neighbors, friends, and family 
members who support wind energy at the broad or specific scale have also been shown 
to influence those who do not support wind energy. However, if an individual has a true 
dislike for a wind energy development, little can be done to sway them. Nevertheless, a 
few scholars have noted that effective communication is one of the steps to increasing 
trust and acquiring support for a development (Krohn and Damborg 1999; Wolsink 
2007; Swofford and Slattery 2010, Pasqualetti 2011). As Wüstenhagen (2007) stated, 
trust is dependent on perceived competence and intentions, which are in turn related to 
perceived similarity of objectives and thinking.  Bell et al. (2005) suggest that 
“information will always be suspect in a climate of mistrust”, but a possible solution is 
that information could be provided to residents from sources they can trust to help them 
make informed decisions about the development and allay their fears. Another proposed 
solution is to change the structure of the decision-making process to be more inclusive of 
residents with the aim of fairness and not causing any perceived injustice. Cowell et al. 
(2011) interpret justice as the equal distribution of goods and bads in the environment, 
but emphasize that in wind energy facility siting, justice is often knotted with sentiments 
of participation and recognition. Wolsink (2010) suggests that collaborative planning is 
the path to improved trust and acceptance, which are also closely associated with 
reciprocity, fairness, openness, respect, and perceived competence among the planners. 
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II. 1. D. Benefits 
Social benefits increase the welfare of the affected community through the 
production of a good or service, which, in the case of Nolan and Taylor Counties, is the 
construction of and electricity generated from wind turbines. Such social benefits 
include control over the siting process in wind development planning, increased place 
identity, job creation and some job retention. Furthermore, the social benefits from these 
two counties extend to the state and national level in terms of renewable electricity 
production, as it benefits more than just Nolan and Taylor Counties.   
Having some control over the siting process in the planning stage of wind 
development can be considered a two-part community benefit. Primarily, it gives the 
community the opportunity to modify, negotiate, and outright decline a proposal, 
effectively giving ownership of the project to the public. Second, it establishes a positive 
relationship between the community and the wind developer, which may help improve 
attitudes toward wind farms in general and the proposed wind farm specifically. Cowell 
et al. (2011) emphasize that the provision of administrative benefits is more favorable 
than pecuniary benefits in terms of reaching an acceptable outcome for all involved 
parties, as financial compensation may be negatively perceived. In cases where the vocal 
minority dominates the decision-making process, Bell et al. (2005) also suggest 
increasing public participation by allowing the unspoken majority to voice their opinions 
through participatory decision-making, though Breukers and Wolsink (2007) amend that 
participatory decision-making is unlikely to sway staunch wind protestors into 
supporters and may have more influence on conditional supporters. Furthermore, greater 
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acceptance can be achieved by means of local ownership through cooperatives or other 
institutions (Wolsink and Breukers 2010; Brannstrom et al. 2011).  
Another social benefit is increased place identity or place attachment, which was 
previously discussed in terms of negative public response. In contrast to the studies that 
declare opposition is an effect of place attachment, numerous residents affected by the 
presence of turbines have reported that turbines are beneficial to the community in some 
way and/or that their place attachment has strengthened (Thayer and Freeman 1987; Bell 
et al. 2005; Sowers 2006; Swofford and Slattery 2010; Warren and McFadyen 2010; 
Brannstrom et al. 2011; Jepson et al. 2012; Slattery et al. 2012; Sovacool and Ratan 
2012). Among the sundry reasons some residents claim a stronger place attachment are 
that the turbines are a sign of progress toward the integration of renewable energy, they 
bring money to the region in the form of taxes and royalties, and they revitalize rural 
areas though tourism and population growth and/or retention. Towns that were once 
facing a severely waning population have begun to flourish after the addition of wind 
farms. According to Boccard (2009), towns with turbines are experiencing a population 
boom or influx as compared to previous years before turbines were present. Wind energy 
also allows the community to prosper by allowing its members to “buy shares in a 
community- or privately-owned wind energy development project so they have a 
financial stake in its success” (Bell et al. 2005), which may also afford the populace a 
sense of ownership and place identity. 
Wind energy has moderate job creation potential, especially during the 
construction phase, and, upon completion, a few specialized industry jobs remain for 
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maintenance and service. The majority of the workforce for wind turbine construction is 
subcontracted for the duration of construction (about one year), and only about 7% of 
those employees stay through the life of the plant, or about twenty years. This roughly 
translates to between eighty and one hundred jobs per 100 MW wind plant, with six to 
eight permanent positions for after-construction maintenance and operations (Slattery et 
al. 2011), or one permanent job for roughly every ten to twelve towers (New Amsterdam 
2008). Furthermore, Brown et al. (2012) note that the average annual income for the 
county increases dramatically with each additional MW of wind power installed. 
According to the American Wind Energy Association (AWEA), “the wind industry 
supported 8,000-9,000 direct and indirect jobs in Texas in 2010 and supports 
approximately 75,000 direct and indirect jobs nationwide” indicating that “Texas is 
particularly strong  in terms of its share of employment in the wind industry relative to 
the nation” (Blair 2012). As an added benefit of the enlarged workforce, local businesses 
often see increased activity and patronage, which in turn aids the local economy through 
rising wages, tax revenues, increased land values, decreased property taxes, and new 
construction.  
II. 2. The socio-economic dimension 
Distribution of economic benefits is perhaps one of the biggest points of 
contention amongst members of the affected community because those benefits seem to 
be distributed unequally. Wind energy has the potential to provide employment, income, 
and tax revenue to the community, and wind farm development may foster employment 
in the affected area for construction, manufacturing, and maintenance personnel. Sub-
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contracted workers provide another possible source of income to the area because they 
spend money at local businesses. In terms of tax revenue, the local government may 
receive up to $12,000 per Megawatt (MW) in tax payments and landowners may receive 
up to $7,000 per MW in lease payments (Slattery et al. 2011). Hefty tax abatements and 
subsidy programs are the largest incentives to developing wind energy, but little is 
known about the distribution of these royalties to private landowners and whether they 
are spatially imbalanced. In fact, no studies have been conducted thus far that regard 
distribution of royalties as a spatial issue. Turbines are sited in rural areas with small 
populations, but in some cases, the areas affected by wind development do not reap the 
benefits. Furthermore, stakeholders tend to be more inclined to accept wind farms than 
those who do not have a stake in the success of the project, further widening the gap 
between those who benefit and those who do not. 
Development of wind farms generally means more employment, sometimes for 
the local workforce, which leads to the generation of revenue and prosperity for the 
town, and the influx of wind employees may also lead to higher wages in the local 
economy. Local schools seem to benefit the most from wind energy revenues in the form 
of improvements to facilities and curriculum, scholarship opportunities, and educational 
electronic aids, which improve the quality of education (New Amsterdam 2008; Blair 
2012; Slattery et al. 2012; Kahn 2013). Texas in particular has seen the growth of the 
wind industry through the creation of technical colleges and training programs designed 
to meet the industry’s needs (Blair 2012). On the other hand, it may also bring about 
hardship for residents due in part to increasing property values and the lack of fiscal 
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contribution from sub-contracted workforce (Brannstrom et al. 2011). In fact, 
“opponents of wind energy developments often highlight the unfairness of the 
distribution of benefits and burdens associated with developments” (Bell et al.2013). 
Many residents in affected areas have reported concerns about the rising cost of rentals 
and real estate due to wind developments (Brannstrom et al. 2011; Blair 2012; Ellis 
2012).   
While scholars have estimated the economic impacts of wind energy, very little 
is known about royalty disbursements or how sensitive royalties are to fluctuation of 
contract terms, specifically, turbine energy output, electricity price, and royalty rates. 
The dearth of literature on this topic is partially due to the proprietary nature of 
information concerning turbines’ wind capacity factors (CFs). CF is the ratio of actual 
energy production to the nameplate production maximum. Early estimates of CFs had an 
incredibly broad scope, spanning from 19% (Iniyan et al. 1998) to 60% (Cavallo 1995). 
Current global estimates of optimum CF are between 20% and 35%, with the upper 
value of 35% being rare (Boccard 2009). Uncertainties about CF affect whether turbine 
upgrades, wind resource fluctuation, and maintenance will significantly alter the 
distribution of royalties. For the purposes of this study, CF will be estimated within two 
categories (low and high). Three variables determine how royalties are allocated: CF, 
wholesale electricity price, and royalty rates (Brannstrom 2012).  Wholesale electricity 
price is also variable and not fully known, but is still restricted information because 
landowners negotiate confidential contracts with wind-power firms and rural farmers 
negotiate with utilities. The wholesale electricity rate is estimated at approximately $35-
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45 per Megawatt hour (MWh) (New Amsterdam 2008; Bolinger and Wiser 2009). 
According to stakeholders (who are primarily attorneys) in Nolan County, landowners 
receive a percentage royalty, normally 4% or a minimum guaranteed payment (New 
Amsterdam 2008). For the purposes of this study, a royalty rate of 4% is used to estimate 
the sensitivity of royalty disbursements.     
II. 3. The public policy dimensions 
Public policies play an important role in the entire process of wind farm 
development, from the Federal level to the community level, and from the infancy of 
planning to the completion of the project. At various levels of the government there are 
several policies in place to encourage the development of renewable energy and reduce 
carbon emissions, including Renewable Portfolio Standards, establishment of 
Competitive Renewable Energy Zones, and the Federal Production Tax Credit. It can be 
argued that wind development owes much of its success to the Federal Production Tax 
Credit (PTC), which is a ten-year inflation-adjusted per-kilowatt-hour income tax credit 
for electricity generated by a qualifying renewable energy source to encourage the 
development of renewables and foster economic growth (Bolinger and Wiser 2009). 
Under the PTC, eligible wind developers receive an income tax credit of 2.3¢ per 
kilowatt-hour (kWh), adjusted for inflation, for the first ten years of operation and 
reducing the cost of wind energy by roughly one-third (Blair 2012). First enacted in 
1992, the Federal PTC has been renewed and revised several times, most recently in 
early 2013 with the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012. However, the Federal PTC 
expired at the end of December 2013, and any new turbines constructed after December 
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31, 2013 are not eligible to receive the credit. The PTC was extended seven times and 
allowed to expire five times, which caused fluctuations and instability in the wind 
energy market due to the uncertainty developers faced in the impending deadline to 
begin construction (Gipe 1998; Bird et al. 2005; Bolinger and Wiser 2009; Blair 2012). 
During years when the PTC approached expiration, wind developments experienced a 
surge in new construction to meet the deadline, and after the PTC had been renewed, 
new construction tapered off. The American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) has 
repeatedly called for extensions to the PTC, even to extend its contract to 10 years 
(AWEA 2012). After the last decade of immense growth in the wind energy sector, the 
last two years has presented a marked diminishment of progress after the expiration of 
the PTC, with only 1,098 MW installed between 2012 and 2013, and 217 MW installed 
between 2013 and 2014.  
Less recognized at the federal level is the Renewable Energy Production 
Incentive, which is a cash production incentive afforded to those who are unable to take 
advantage of the Federal PTC. Unfortunately, funds are subject to Congressional 
appropriations and have an uncertain availability; as such, the effectiveness of the 
incentive is limited (Bird et al. 2005). Although some Federal regulations and incentives 
encourage the development of renewables, individual states are permitted to determine 
whether to implement them based on their available resources and electricity needs, as in 
the Public Utility Resources Policy Act (PURPA). PURPA was enacted in 1978 in 
response to an energy crisis, and was intended to reduce energy demand by promoting 
the development of renewables domestically. While it depreciated over time, PURPA 
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played an important role in the advancement of renewable energies by exempting 
renewable developers from some regulatory laws. Market factors that may affect the 
expansion of wind power are the competitive pricing of alternatives such as natural gas, 
the state of the national economy, technological improvements, availability and cost of 
turbine components, and supply and demand fluctuation (Bird et al. 2005; Bolinger and 
Wiser 2009; Blair 2012). Higher costs may slow or cease the development of new wind 
projects.   
At the state level, the main drivers of wind development are renewable portfolio 
mandates, feed-in tariffs, and other tax exemptions. A Renewable Portfolio Standard 
(RPS), also called a Renewable Energy Standard (RES), is a policy that requires 
electricity providers to supply a certain percentage of their electricity from renewable 
sources by a specific date (Bird et al. 2005), allowing it to be competitively priced with 
cheaper fossil-based fuels. RPS have been implemented in thirty-seven US States, either 
mandatorily (RPS) or voluntarily (Goals) as of 2013, but there is no program in place at 
the national level. The Texas RPS began in 1999 with Texas State Senate Bill 7, which 
mandated 2,000 Megawatts (MW) of renewable energy generation by 2009. Texas and 
Iowa were the first states to institute renewable energy requirements, beginning the 
impetus for increased energy capacity in the United States, and allowing the U.S. to 
become a global competitor in the renewable energy market (Blair 2012).  The mandate 
for RPS for the upcoming years is 5,880 MW by 2015 and a goal of 10,000 MW by 
2025 for all qualifying renewable energy sources. Feed-in tariffs (FIT), on the other 
hand, are designed to stimulate investment in renewable energy through long-term 
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contracts with renewable energy providers based on the cost of energy generation. 
Renewable electricity providers are paid a cost-based price for renewable electricity 
supplied to the grid, promoting the development of diverse technologies. FIT have only 
been employed in a handful of U.S. States including California, Florida, and New York, 
though few states utilize FIT for wind-generated electricity. Several policies and market 
factors can be used to promote wind energy, but the most effective is state RPS. 
Texas specifically owes much of its success in wind development to the factors 
listed above in addition to a simple permitting system, high social acceptance, an 
abundant wind resource, and the Texas Public Utility Commission’s (PUC) Competitive 
Renewable Energy Zones (CREZ).  There are no climate-change or Greenhouse Gas 
(GHG) mandates in Texas. The Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) was 
authorized to create CREZ in 2005 with State Senate Bill 20 and the initiative of the 
Texas PUC. CREZ are sites where the best wind energy potential exists and from which 
transmission lines are constructed to deliver renewable energy to consumers throughout 
Texas. The PUC allotted nearly $7 billion to the construction of transmission lines by 
seven transmission and distribution utilities. Five CREZ were established in 2008: 
Panhandle A, Panhandle B, Central West, Central, and McCamey (PUCT 2012). The 
project was completed at the end of 2013 and transmits 18,500 MW of wind power from 
windy west Texas and the panhandle to highly-populated metropolitan areas of the state 
(PUCT 2014).  
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
This chapter details the data sources utilized for this study and the descriptive and 
analytical methods used to determine the estimated spatial distribution of wind-power 
royalties potentially generated by wind power in Nolan and Taylor Counties. 
 
III. 1. Data 
The study area is comprised of Nolan and Taylor Counties located in west-
central Texas (Figure 1), which are home to the Roscoe Wind Farm and the Horse 
Hollow Wind Energy Center, two of the largest wind farms in the world. These two 
counties are part of a larger expanse of wind farms that stretch across a five-county area 
including Fisher, Scurry, and Mitchell Counties. There are 2,262 wind turbines in this 
five-county region, with an installed capacity of more than 3 Gigawatts (GW). Nolan 
and Taylor Counties alone have 1,746 tur bines, with an installed capacity of 2.8 GW. 
Nolan County accommodates 1,372 turbines from fifteen wind farms with an installed 
capacity of more than 2 GW. Taylor County holds 374 turbines from six wind farms and 
has an installed capacity of 625 Megawatts (MW). Nolan and Taylor Counties combined 
have a land area of 474,744 hectares, most of which is rural land used for cattle grazing, 
hunting leases, and cotton, and are home to more than 145,000 people. Located in 
northeast Taylor County is the major metropolitan area of Abilene, where about 80% of 
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Figure 1. Nolan and Taylor Counties in west Texas with parcel delineation and turbine points. Number parcels= 75,595. 
Number turbines=1,745. 
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the county’s population resides; the nearest wind farm is approximately 20 miles from 
the heart of Abilene. Sweetwater, the study region’s next largest city 
(population=10,762), regularly hosts wind-energy and related events and trade shows. Its 
economic and political elites have labeled the city as a center of wind energy in North 
America. Wind turbines are approximately seven miles from the center of Sweetwater. 
Roscoe, a much smaller town (population=1,322) is surrounded by wind farms, which 
are mainly located on land devoted to growing cotton, which is irrigated only 
infrequently because of slightly saline groundwater. Wind farms first developed in the 
western portion of Taylor County, with the 150 MW Trent Mesa wind farm in 2001, 
which has a contract with College Station Utilities as part of the Wind Watts program. 
Wind-farm construction expanded onto mesas south of Sweetwater. During 2009-2010, 
most new wind turbines were being located on farmland near Roscoe.   
Data for this research were gathered from the Nolan and Taylor County 
Appraisal Districts (CAD), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Public 
Utility Commission (PUC). Data from CAD and FAA were obtained in 2011 from the 
NextEra Wind Energy Project based at Texas Christian University. The CAD records for 
the 2010 tax year contain landowner information such as name, address, land area, 
taxable value, and other legal information. These records are used in conjunction with 
parcel polygons to spatially visualize land ownership. Additionally, wind turbine 
coordinates from the FAA in the form of points are used in union with PUC records for 
the spatial locations of turbines, the name of the farm to which turbines belong, the 
number of turbines in each farm, and each tower’s nameplate (installed) capacity, which 
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normally is the turbine’s maximum output. All spatial data for this study are utilized and 
illustrated through ArcGIS 10.2.  
III. 2. Methods 
The first step toward determining how wind royalties are spatially distributed is 
to determine the amount each wind farm generates in royalties based on the PUC data, 
which contains the nameplate capacity (maximum output) of turbines. Only a handful of 
scholars have approximated the amount in royalties generated by wind energy, which is 
generally estimated around $5,000 per turbine per year. The deficiency in wind energy 
literature about wind royalties is partly due to the confidential nature of the contracts 
between landowners and wind developers. However, as the study by New Amsterdam 
(2008) indicates, estimating royalties is actually quite simple. Additionally, Brannstrom 
et al. (2011) interviewed key actors in this study’s community who provided insight into 
current estimates of royalty rates. The three main factors affecting the total royalties 
received by landowners are wind capacity factor (CF), royalty rate, and wholesale 
electricity price. Several factors influence the CF of a turbine, including intermittency of 
the power source (i.e. the wind), engineering, wind characteristics, and economic and 
grid curtailment. For example, a 1 MW turbine that has an abundant wind resource, but 
is inefficient, poorly maintained, and has a below average transmission capacity may 
have a CF far lower than an efficient 1 MW turbine with excellent maintenance, steady 
wind, and excellent transmission capacity. The daily CF is likely to vary from one day to 
the next due to wind intermittency, so CF calculations have been derived from multiple 
years’ worth of data (Boccard 2009).  Furthermore, since there is currently no way to 
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store electricity generated from wind energy, if there is a surplus of energy, some 
turbines may be placed in neutral position until electricity prices rise enough to 
overcome operating expenses. 
In principle, hourly CF for wind turbines in Texas could be calculated from data 
maintained by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), the grid operator. 
However, CF, as previously indicated, is a function of wind conditions, mechanical 
engineering in the gearbox, software engineering of controls, maintenance, economic 
conditions, and transmission capacity, all of which make CF fluctuate on timescales 
ranging from minutes to months. Therefore, actual output of electricity in megawatts 
(MW) per turbine may vary, on a single day, from zero to 100%. However, ERCOT 
datasets on CF are highly complex and computationally challenging to analyze; 
moreover, analyses of actual CF using ERCOT data have not appeared in the peer-
reviewed literature. Most estimates in the published literature indicate that it is 
reasonable to assume a CF between 25% and 35%. Making this assumption, rather than 
analyzing ERCOT data does not undermine these estimates of the spatial distribution of 
royalties, using only the mean estimated royalty per parcel.  
In this study the royalty rate of 4% was estimated from previous research that 
included semi-structured interviews with key actors knowledgeable about this process 
(Brannstrom et al.2011). Royalty rates, indicated on private contracts between 
landowners and wind farm developers are confidential and variable, but the 4% rate is 
considered reasonable for the two-county study region. Some landowners received less 
than 4% and others negotiated higher rates; the estimated royalty rate does not account 
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for potential rents obtained through roads, maintenance facilities, or substations sited on 
private land. 
The third estimated variable is the wholesale electricity price, which is also 
highly variable, as Baldick (2012) has reported. Moreover, the actual price that an 
individual wind farm obtains is dependent on several factors, such as presence of long- 
or short-term contracts, whether the operator seeks the spot (instant) market, and 
whether the operator has entered the market for the Renewable Electricity Credits 
(RECs). ERCOT datasets indicate wholesale prices in real time; however, these data are 
highly challenging to analyze and they may not present the actual prices that wind-farm 
operators use to calculate royalties they pay to landowners.  Therefore, wholesale 
electricity price is estimated between $35 and $45/MWh, congruent with published 
analyses (Baldick 2012).  
In summary, the three variables that determine royalty payments to landowners 
are located in confidential contracts impossible to obtain or housed in highly complex 
datasets; by contrast, the datasets that indicate the location of wind turbines, their 
nameplate capacity, and landowners, are relative transparent and far less difficult to 
manipulate in a spatial context. Therefore, this study seeks precision and accuracy in 
terms of the location of wind turbines and land parcels, while opting to use reasonable 
estimates for CF, royalty rate, and electricity price. For example, if a single turbine has a 
nameplate capacity of 1.5 MW, the formula to determine its royalty would appear as 
outlined in Table 1 below. 
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The low royalty for a 1.5 MW turbine is $4,599, the high royalty is $8,278, and the 
average royalty is $6,439. Royalties are distributed on a turbine-per-year basis, so one 1 
MW turbine would generate an average of $6,439 per year for a landowner. Nameplate 
capacities of turbines for the study region range from 1 MW to 2.3 MW and vary by 
wind farm. PUC records for some wind farms indicate a discrepancy between the 
number of turbines in the model and those confirmed by the PUC. However, as many of 
the turbines attributed to an incorrect wind farm have the same nameplate capacities, this 
is largely disregarded in this study. A complete summary table of the royalty 
calculations for the study area can be found in Appendix A.  
Attribution of the royalty estimates per turbine to landowners is completed in 
several steps in GIS. First, the raw tax appraisal data (75,595 parcel polygons), FAA 
data (1,746 turbine points), and PUC data (16 unique wind farms) are integrated across 
the two-county study region (Figure 1). The blank or “missing” parcels in Nolan County 
in Figure 1 are owned by the State of Texas and therefore have no ownership 
information associated with them. As such, the 44 turbines on these “missing” parcels 
have been removed from the maps, but information regarding energy output and 
royalties have been retained for analysis. Then, urban parcels were eliminated using the 
Low High
Capacity Factor (CF) 1.50 MW * 0.25 = 0.375 1.50 MW * 0.35 = 0.525
Hours/year 0.375 * 8,760 = 3,285 0.525 * 8,760 = 4,599
Low revenue ($/MWh) 3,285 * 35 = 114,975 4599 * 35 = 160,965
High revenue ($/MWh) 3,285 * 45 = 147,825 4599 * 45 = 206,955
Royalty rate low revenue 114,975 * 0.04 = $4,598.56 160965 * 0.04 = $6,438.60
Royalty rate high revenue 147,825 * 0.04 = $5,913 206955 * 0.04 = $8,278.20
Table 1. Example royalty calculation for a 1.5 Megawatt (MW) turbine. 
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geographic boundaries of cities or towns because turbines are not located in urban areas. 
This procedure yielded 17,526 parcels, approximately 76% fewer than the initial total 
(Figure 2).  
 
Next, the remaining 1,702 turbine points were joined to the parcels. This 
procedure yielded a count of the number of turbines per parcel. Associated wind 
information such as CF and wind farm name were then included in the parcel attribute 
table. Land parcels were then dissolved by landowner tax address to consolidate 
landowners who own several contiguous and non-contiguous parcels of land (Figure 3), 
thus reducing the number of parcels further to 8,369, approximately 89% fewer than the 
initial total. Summary statistics for the land area of this dataset are presented in Table 2. 
This step also has the added advantage of effectively illustrating rural parcel ownership. 
This procedure relies upon tax address as the ultimate unique characteristic of land. If  
Figure 2. Nolan and Taylor Counties with urban areas removed. Number of 
parcels=17,526. 
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tax addresses of two distinct parcels, in terms of property tax, are identical, then we 
assume they are controlled by the same landowner and parcels are aggregated through 
the dissolve procedure. For the purposes of this study, it does not matter whether 
landowners are individuals, LLCs or trusts—the address used to receive property tax 
statements from the county tax appraisal office is what is of interest. This may have 
resulted in under-estimated concentration of land ownership in the event that one 
Figure 3. Nolan and Taylor Counties with urban areas removed and dissolved by 
landowner address. Number parcels=8,369. 
Area (Hectares)
Mean 54.10
Median 2.39
Mode 0.42
STDEV 254.78
Table 2. Summary statistics 
for all non-urban landowners 
dissolved by tax address. 
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landowner or landholding entity used different tax addresses for different parcels.  Next, 
the landowners without turbines were removed, leaving only 241 landowners with 
turbines (parcels=578), and 99.3% fewer parcels than the initial total (Figure 4). 
Therefore, 0.7% of all land parcels in the two-county study region are the location of 
installed wind power and ~3% of all unique rural tax addresses (rural landowners after 
parcel aggregation) are the location of wind turbines. 
 
The next procedure was to determine whether landowners live on their parcels 
based on comparison between situs address (the latitudinal and longitudinal location of 
the parcel) and tax address. In this research, the situs is the latitude and longitude of the 
centroid of the parcel, and in cases where landowners own non-contiguous parcels, the 
situs is the center point between the centroids of the non-contiguous parcels. It is clear, 
after a cursory glance, which landowners are immediately categorized as non-residents 
Figure 4. Nolan and Taylor Counties with urban areas removed, dissolved by 
landowner address, and landowners with turbines only. Number parcels=578. Number 
landowners=241. 
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when the tax address is in another state, however, other landowners are more difficult to 
classify. This step is important because it is unknown whether royalties accrue to 
landowners who reside near their parcels. However, if landowners do not actually reside 
in the area, then it is unlikely that royalties are circulating in the local economy. To 
determine residency, the latitude and longitude coordinates of the centroid of the parcel 
are needed along with the tax address. This data, when entered in to a Google Maps 
directions form, will yield turn-by-turn directions via public transport, vehicle, bicycle, 
or pedestrian as well as the travel time and distance from one place to another. However, 
there are 241 landowners with turbines, which makes the process of determining 
landowner status challenging. For this reason, a simple code was written in C# to query 
Google Maps for only driving distance and time between two points without turn-by-
turn instructions for all landowners. The output of the code is illustrated in Figure 5, and 
this information is entered into landowner attributes to facilitate separation of residents 
from non-residents via a simple relationship.  
Landowners were separated into two groups: residents and non-residents. 
Residents live within twenty miles of their situs addresses, so for the purpose of this 
research, landowners live on or near their parcels and therefore, their turbines and all 
associated information is attributed to the parcel. This threshold is based on the 
assumption that the landowner must travel from one’s situs address to retrieve mail from 
the tax address (where tax statements are mailed), and that twenty miles is too far to 
travel one way to do so. The 241 landowners with turbines become 129 resident  
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landowners (approximately 54% of total landowners with turbines) and 112 non-
residents (Figure 6). Non-residents live more than twenty miles or forty-five minutes 
from their parcels, so turbines and associated information for these landowners must be 
attributed somewhere other than their parcels. Given that landowner tax addresses 
contain a street address at the most specific level and a zip code at the broadest level, the 
only way to visualize non-residents is at the zip code level. However, Zip Code 
Tabulated Areas (or ZCTAs) are not widely-recognizable boundaries, unlike county 
boundaries. Therefore, the county name needs to be established for each non-resident 
landowner, which is accomplished by performing a simple Google search query of the 
county for each unique Zip Code. Using the combination of Zip Codes, county names, 
Figure 5. Output of code which feeds in the coordinate of the centroid of the 
parcel and the tax address and gives an output of the driving distance and time 
between the two points. 
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and American National Standards Institute (ANSI) state codes (i.e. Texas’ state code is 
48, Oklahoma’s state code is 40, etc.), data for each non-resident landowner’s turbine 
count and royalty is retained in the attribute table for counties. Several landowners reside 
in the same counties as their fellow non-residents, especially in the larger cities in Texas, 
which distributes the 112 non-residents across 53 counties nationwide (Figure 7). 
Counties with multiple non-resident contributors have a cumulative count of turbines 
and royalties. 
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Figure 6. Parcels of landowners with turbines who live less than or equal to 20 miles driving distance or 45 minutes driving 
time from tax address (residents displayed in blue). Number landowners=129. 
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Figure 7. Counties of landowners with turbines who live more than 20 miles or 45 minutes from the tax address (non-
residents). There are 112 non-resident landowners in 53 counties nationwide. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 
This chapter describes the main findings of this thesis regarding characteristics of 
landowners with turbines, the spatial distribution of turbines, and the spatial distribution 
of estimated wind-power royalties. 
 
IV. 1. Spatial distribution of turbines 
The spatial distribution of turbines in the two-county area is skewed heavily 
toward Nolan County and follows no discernible pattern other than avoidance of 
urbanized areas and transportation routes; however, this observation is a testable claim 
beyond the scope of this research. As previously discussed, these wind farms are situated 
in areas where the wind resource is likely the greatest, and where transmission lines are 
accessible. In brief, Nolan and Taylor Counties contain 1,701 turbines owned by 241 
landowners on 66,117 hectares. Most turbines are located in central and east Nolan 
County and in the northwest section of Nolan County near the town of Roscoe 
(illustrated in Figures 1 and 4), with a small portion of turbines in Taylor County. Of the 
75,595 total parcels, 578 have turbines, which equates to 0.7% of the total number of 
parcels. Out of 8,408 rural landowners (aggregated by tax address), 241 have turbines on 
their land, which amounts to ~3% of the total rural landowners. Nolan County hosts 
1,372 turbines from sixteen wind farms, and there are 373 turbines from six wind farms 
in Taylor County, representing about 22% of the total number of turbines for both 
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counties. The 297 turbines located in the area northwest and southwest of Roscoe in 
Nolan County are within three wind farms, and make up about 17% of total turbines. 
These turbines are on smaller parcels of less than 600 hectares per single parcel, and 
there are no more than ten turbines on a single parcel. The larger parcels located in the 
center of the two counties are mainly ranchland and generally contain more turbines than 
those on farmland. There are eleven landowners whose tax records specify that their land 
is used as a working ranch (as part of a Corporation or Partnership of some type). These 
eleven landowners hold 281 of the total turbines (about 16%), and are situated on 
approximately 10,600 hectares combined, spread across the middle of the two counties. 
Meanwhile, there are only two landowners whose tax records specify their land is used 
as a working farm, both of which are located near Roscoe as previously indicated. Only 
eleven turbines are located on these smaller parcels with a total land size of 269 hectares. 
Of all parcels with turbines, 15% have only one turbine, and 21% have ten or more 
turbines. Furthermore, there are forty-four turbines in Nolan County from seven wind 
farms that are owned by the State of Texas; about 2.5% of the total number of turbines. 
To better understand the allocation of turbines amongst landowners, all 
landowners with turbines were divided into quintiles of approximately 48 landowners 
per quintile. Table 3 illustrates each quintile with selected statistics, and Figure 8 is a 
box and whisker plot of turbine quintiles derived from Table 2. The bottom of the lower 
box (“Bottom” in Table 3) rests on the first quartile (“Q1” in Table 3). “2Q Box” refers 
to the second quartile, or the difference between the median and the first quartile, and 
“3Q Box” refers to the third quartile, or the difference between the third quartile (“Q3”) 
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and the median. “Whisker –” denotes the difference between Q1 and the minimum, and 
“Whisker +” denotes the difference between the maximum and Q3. The majority of 
turbines (60%) are in the top quintile, meaning that approximately one-fifth of 
landowners have 60% of the total turbines on their property. The maximum number of 
turbines on a single landowner’s property is 104, with an overall mean of 7, a median of 
4, and a mode of 2 turbines per landowner. Generally, landowners with large parcels are 
expected to have more turbines than landowners with smaller parcels because of turbine 
spacing requirements. Many times this is the case, though there are a few exceptions, as 
illustrated in Figure 9.  
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Table 3. Turbine and royalty quintiles with totals and percentages. 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Count 48 48 48 48 49
Mean 21.25 6.83 3.60 2.44 1.29
STDEV 17.92 1.65 0.5 0.5 0.46
Min 10 5 3 2 1
Q1 12 5 3 2 1
Median 14 6 4 2 1
Q3 20 8 4 3 2
Max 104 10 5 3 2
Bottom 12 5 3 2 1
2Q Box 2 1 1 0 0
3Q Box 6 2 0 1 1
Whisker- 2 0 0 0 0
Whisker+ 84 2 1 0 0
Total 1,020          328             173             117          63            
Percent 60.0% 19.3% 10.2% 6.9% 3.7%
Mean 146,189     44,356       26,032       15,998    7,656      
STDEV 111,288     10,932       4,134          3,340      2,067      
Min 70,829       30,904       19,746       9,873      4,292      
Q1 83,707       37,556       21,460       12,876    6,439      
Median 100,444     39,492       27,473       17,168    8,584      
Q3 142,942     51,512       29,619       19,317    9,873      
Max 591,474     69,534       30,904       19,746    9,873      
Bottom 83,707       37,556       21,460       12,876    6,439      
2Q Box 16,737       1,936          6,013          4,292      2,145      
3Q Box 42,498       12,020       2,146          2,149      1,289      
Whisker- 12,878       6,652          1,714          3,003      2,147      
Whisker+ 448,532     18,022       1,285          429          -           
Total 7,017,091 2,129,078 1,249,539 767,913  375,148  
Percent 60.8% 18.5% 10.8% 6.7% 3.3%
Turbine and Royalty Quintiles
Turbines
Royalties
47 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Q1Q2Q3Q4Q5
 N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
tu
rb
in
es
 
Figure 8. Distribution of turbines by landowner quintiles 
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relationship between parcel size and number of turbines. 
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IV. 2. Spatial distribution of royalties 
The total estimated amount in royalties paid to all landowners with turbines is 
$11,538,769 per year. If all royalties were distributed equally amongst the 241 
landowners with turbines, this would amount to $47,879 per landowner. If royalties were 
distributed equally amongst all rural landowners in the two counties, each rural 
landowner would receive approximately $1,372 per year. Yet, the spatial distribution of 
royalties is imbalanced (Figure 10). Some rural landowners did not have desirable land 
for wind turbines and others refused contracts offered by wind-farm developers, but the 
precise reason is not possible to determine with available data. As expected, landowners 
who own smaller parcels tend to receive less in royalties than landowners with larger 
parcels because larger parcels can support more turbines. Wind turbines require adequate 
spacing and they must be well-suited according to knowledge of wind characteristics, 
electricity substations, maintenance roads, and transmission lines. However, a larger 
parcel does not always equate larger royalties, as shown in Figure11. For instance, the 
parcel that contains the fifth most turbines (n=44) is larger than the parcel that contains 
the second most turbines (n=74) by about 600 hectares and the latter landowner receives 
approximately $186,000 more in royalties per year on average than the former. Some 
landowners also have several different wind farms represented on their property which 
generate distinctly different amounts in royalty payments, which may be another cause 
for the discrepancy in payments from one landowner to the next. Also expected is that 
landowners with more turbines are likely to receive more royalties. However, because of 
the disparity between royalty payments in different wind farms caused by varying
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Figure 10. The spatial distribution of royalties to all landowners with turbines. The key is binned by landowner quintiles. 
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nameplate capacities, some landowners with  fewer turbines receive more in royalties 
than those with more turbines. In one particular instance, one landowner has twelve 
turbines, receiving $51,504 average per year in royalties, while another landowner with 
eight turbines receives $61,808 average per year. Average royalty payments range 
between $4,292 and $9,873 and the overall average for all farms is $7,404 per turbine 
per year. The aggregate mean is $47,879, with a median of $25,756, and a mode of 
$29,619 per landowner per year. The minimum amount a single landowner is paid on 
average per year in royalties is $4,292, and the maximum is $591,500.   
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Figure 11. Total mean estimated royalty by land size in hectares. The r
2
 value 
indicates that there is a strong relationship between land size and royalties. 
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To better understand how royalties are distributed amongst landowners with 
turbines, all landowners with turbines were divided into quintiles of approximately forty-
eight landowners per quintile. Table 3 illustrates each quintile with statistics, and Figure 
12 is a box-and-whisker illustration of royalties as described in Table 3. Since the 
correlation between number of turbines and royalties is so strong, Figure 12 closely 
resembles Figure 8 in shape. It is clear from Table 3 that the majority of total royalties 
(about 61%) are in the top quintile. That is, the forty-eight landowners with the most 
turbines receive about 61% of the total royalties per year, while the fifth quintile, the 
20% of landowners with the fewest turbines comprised of forty-nine landowners, 
receives approximately 3% of the total royalties. Almost 80% of royalties are distributed 
to 40% of turbine-possessing landowners. The forty-four turbines owned by the State of 
Texas have a royalty range between $4,292 and $9,873 average per turbine, and an 
accumulated sum of $267,421 per year; just over 2% of the total royalties for the two 
counties. When this sum is added to the total mean estimated royalties paid to all 
landowners, the average sum of all royalties for Nolan and Taylor Counties is 
$11,806,190 per year. There are thirteen landowners whose land is used either as farm or 
ranchland. The eleven landowners whose tax records indicate their land is used as a 
working ranch hold $1,998,229 of royalties, which is about 17% of the total royalties, 
and the two landowners with working farms hold $47,212, which is less than half a 
percentage of the total royalties (~0.41%). The royalty per parcel also appears lower in 
the parcels surrounding Roscoe compared to the parcels on mesas south of Sweetwater. 
Since the parcels surrounding Roscoe are smaller than many of the parcels south of 
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Sweetwater, it is expected that fewer turbines would fit on the land and therefore, fewer 
royalties would accrue there. A t-test was performed to compare the total mean 
estimated royalty for both areas at the 95% confidence level. The test revealed that mean 
royalties for the two areas are significantly different (Table 4). This difference may be 
explained by unsuitability of the land near Roscoe to host several turbines, or the 
fragmentation of the land into smaller parcels. The low p-values for both the equal 
variance and unequal variance two-tail t-test indicate that there is evidence in 
contradiction of the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the mean 
royalties for the Roscoe area and the area south of Sweetwater. 
 
54 
 
 -
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
Q1Q2Q3Q4Q5
To
ta
l m
ea
n
 e
st
im
at
ed
ro
ya
lt
ie
s/
ye
ar
 (
$
1
,0
0
0
) 
Figure 12. Distribution of total mean estimated royalties per year by landowners quintiles. 
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Table 4. T-test and selected statistics comparing total mean estimated royalty (TMER) of the area around Roscoe and 
all other areas. The p-value indicates that there is a significant difference between TMER for the two areas. 
T Test: Two Independent Samples
SUMMARY Hyp Mean Diff 0
Groups Count Mean Variance Cohen d
TMER_Roscoe 85 19,310              251457420.8
TMER_Other 156 63,307              6947410908
Pooled 4594021398 0.649128806
T TEST: Equal Variances Alpha 0.05
 std err t-stat df p-value t-crit lower upper sig effect r
One Tail 9137.623634 4.814975955 239 1.30662E-06 1.651254165 yes 0.297365811
Two Tail 9137.623634 4.814975955 239 2.61324E-06 1.969939406 -61998.00296 -25996.87321 yes 0.297365811
T TEST: Unequal Variances Alpha 0.05
 std err t-stat df p-value t-crit lower upper sig effect r
One Tail 6891.517097 6.384289187 174.8527392 7.49698E-10 1.653607437 yes 0.434786649
Two Tail 6891.517097 6.384289187 174.8527392 1.4994E-09 1.973612462 -57598.62211 -30396.25406 yes 0.434786649
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IV. 3. Resident/non-resident comparisons 
Out of the 241 total landowners with turbines, 129 have a local tax address and are 
considered residents, according to the definition used in the previous chapter (drive 
time>=45 minutes, or drive distance>=20 miles) and of the total 1,701 turbines, 914 
(about 54%) are located on parcels where landowners are residents. Total royalties paid 
to resident landowners are $6,115,102 on average per year; 53% of the total royalties for 
all landowners. The maximum royalty paid to a single resident landowner is $591,474 
per year, and the average royalty payment for residents is $47,404 per year. Average 
land size per residential landowner is 258 hectares, with a minimum of 8, a maximum of 
5,194, and a median of 128 hectares. The land area held by residents is 33,312 hectares, 
which is about 50% of the total land area for all landowners with turbines. This land area 
has value itself in addition to the value of the wind turbines, but appraised land value is 
indeterminable once parcels have been dissolved partly because of the unknown process 
of estimating land value. Figure 13 indicates the spatial distribution of royalties for 
resident landowners, which appears to follow no specific pattern in terms of land size, 
number of turbines, spatial distribution of residents, or distribution of royalties.  
The remaining 787 turbines are located on parcels where landowners have a non-
local tax address, meaning they drive more than twenty miles (~32 km) or forty-five 
minutes to reach their tax address and therefore live outside the area. Most of the results 
depicted in Figure 5 cannot definitively answer the question of whether landowners are 
truly residents or non-residents, but they do provide insight into where landowners might 
reside permanently. The forty-five minute/twenty mile threshold may seem arbitrary, 
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Figure 13. The spatial distribution of royalties for resident landowners of Nolan and Taylor Counties illustrated in gradients 
of blue. Non-resident landowners with turbines are outlined in light gray. The key is binned  by landowner quintiles. 
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however, it was chosen based upon travel time to retrieve mail from the tax address 
mailbox, as forty-five minutes is an unreasonable amount of time to drive one way to 
retrieve mail. Figure 14 illustrates the driving distance for each landowner from their 
situs to their tax address. Several landowners are considered non-residents though they 
reside in Nolan or Taylor County as a result of the situs-to-tax-address calculation. Only 
eighteen landowners in Nolan and Taylor Counties are classified as non-residents despite 
their situs addresses also being in Nolan or Taylor, which equates to 7% of the total 
landowners with turbines, and 16% of non-residents. Amongst these landowners, 
$971,848 is accrued in royalty payments, which is ~8% of the total estimated royalty 
distribution, and ~18% of the total estimated non-resident royalty distribution. A total of 
$7,086,950 accrues to all residents with tax addresses in Nolan and Taylor Counties 
(~61% of total royalties). Less than half of the landowners with turbines have non-local 
tax addresses, as previously indicated in Figures 6 and 7. Figure 15 is a representation of 
each landowner’s spatial relationship to their tax address in terms of whether they reside 
in Nolan and Taylor Counties, inside Texas, or outside Texas. The total mean estimated 
royalty for the 112 non-resident landowners is $5,423,667 annually, which is about 47% 
of the total royalties per year. Non-residents receive an estimated average of $48,426 per 
landowner per year, and the maximum royalty to one landowner is $407,373 per year. 
While the difference between the non-resident and resident average royalty per 
landowner per year is only slightly more than the average royalty for one turbine, the 
majority of royalties accrue to landowners with local tax addresses. The land area of the 
59 
 
non-resident parcels is 32,805 hectares with a minimum of 5, a maximum of 2,933 and a 
median of 130 hectares.  
The spatial distribution of royalties for non-resident landowners is localized 
within Texas and follows no perceptible spatial pattern outside of Texas (Figure 16). 
Fifteen of the 112 non-resident landowners reside outside of Texas as recorded in Table 
5, comprising about 13% of the non-resident population and about 6% of the total 
landowners with turbines.  Non-residents in states other than Texas accrue $798,857 per 
year in royalties, which amounts to ~15% of the total non-resident royalties, and ~7% of 
the total royalties. Within the non-resident group, 97 landowners reside within Texas, 
where $4,624,810 (~85%) of non-resident royalties and 40% of the total royalties are 
distributed. Figure 17 illustrates the spatial distribution of royalties for non-residential 
landowners only in Texas. Most royalties (~61%) are allocated to addresses in Nolan and 
Taylor Counties, despite being the two counties where the turbines are sited, and 11% of  
total royalties is generally distributed in major metropolitan areas in Texas rather than in 
smaller cities or towns. For example, Dallas, Fort Worth, and Austin are three of the 
cities with the highest royalties. This suggests that landowners with the most turbines are 
living in larger metropolitan areas than in smaller towns, or that more landowners live in 
large cities, as many counties have a cumulative count for landowners receiving 
royalties.  
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Figure 14. Drive distance (in km) from situs address to tax address for all landowners in Nolan and Taylor Counties. 
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Figure 15. Landowner residence status for each landowner in Nolan and Taylor Counties. 
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Figure 16. The spatial distribution of royalties for non-residents by county with Nolan and Taylor County total royalty for 
comparison. 
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A t-test was performed to compare the mean royalties for residents and non-
residents at the 95% confidence level. The test determined that mean royalties for the 
two groups are not significantly different (Table 6). The p-value of 0.91 for both the 
equal variance and unequal variance two-tail t-test indicates that there is no evidence in 
contradiction of the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the mean 
royalties for residents and non-residents. 
IV. 4. Landowner type and land tenure 
Another consideration in determining royalty distribution is type of land 
ownership or tenure. In this study, any landowner not listed as an individual or an 
individual with a spouse in tax records is regarded as a non- traditional owner type or 
State County Turbines Royalty
LA Rapides Parish 1 9,873          
AR Pulaski 2 8,584          
WA Clark 2 19,746       
NM Curry 2 8,584          
FL Walton 2 12,878       
WA Clallam 4 39,492       
NJ Burlington 5 32,195       
CO Larimer 8 51,512       
OR Klamath 9 84,563       
TN Davidson 10 64,390       
CA Placer 11 70,829       
TN Shelby 13 83,707       
CO La Plata 14 125,773     
AL Jefferson 14 90,146       
AZ Gila 15 96,585       
112 798,857     
Table 5. Non-resident landowners not residing in 
Texas 
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a landowner with some land tenure in place. Tenure is the legal regime in which land is 
owned, controlled, used, and transferred. Numerous parcels in Nolan and Taylor 
Counties are not owned by an individual or set of individuals, but are listed as life 
estates, trusts, Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs), Limited Partnerships (LPs), or are 
companies or working ranches. Nearly one-third (n=78, or 32%) of all landowners with 
turbines fall into one of the above categories, and approximately 45% of total royalties 
per year are attributed to such landowners (Table 7). Within this group, forty-six 
landowners are non-residents, with $3,100,545 paid in average yearly royalties (~ 27% 
Figure 17. The spatial distribution of royalties for non-residents only in Texas 
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of the total royalties, and ~57% of non-resident royalties), and thirty-two landowners are 
residents with $2,056,565 paid in average yearly royalties (~18% of the total royalties, 
and ~34% of resident royalties). 738 turbines are located on land where some type of 
tenure is in effect, 433 of which are on property where the landowner is considered a 
non-resident. Nine of the fifteen non-resident landowners not residing in Texas have 
some type of tenure in effect, accounting for seventy-six turbines and $541,301 per year 
in royalties.  
The most-represented land tenure types are Trusts (twenty-three landowners), 
and those who have specified their ownership as “Et al” (eighteen landowners). The 
least-represented land tenure types are listed as “Family” (one landowner), and 
“Company” (two landowners). Despite Trusts being the most represented land tenure 
type for residents and non-residents, the tenure type with the most turbines and royalties 
are LTDs or Limited companies with 181 turbines and $1,229,394 in annual royalties 
(11% of total royalties). The probable reasons for placing land ownership in this type of 
regime are to protect the land or landowners, transfer the land to beneficiaries, or for tax 
purposes.  
IV. 5. Sensitivity of royalties to fluctuation of contract terms 
As previously discussed, some scholars and observers claim that the royalty 
payments are $5,000 per turbine per year, while other sources claim that royalties range 
between $5,000 and $10,000 per turbine per year. The total estimated average royalty for 
this study site is $7,404 per turbine per year, with a minimum average royalty of $4,292 
and a maximum average royalty of $9,873 per turbine per year. Our estimates fit within  
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T Test: Two Independent Samples
SUMMARY Hyp Mean Diff 0
Groups Count Mean Variance Cohen d
Residents 129 47,404           5638150684
Non-residents 112 48,426           4351197784
Pooled 5040444525 0.014391029
T TEST: Equal Variances Alpha 0.05
 std err t-stat df p-value t-crit lower upper sig effect r
One Tail 9169.361066 0.111426165 239 0.455685966 1.651254 no 0.007207
Two Tail 9169.361066 0.111426165 239 0.911371932 1.969939 -19084.8 17041.38 no 0.007207
T TEST: Unequal Variances Alpha 0.05
 std err t-stat df p-value t-crit lower upper sig effect r
One Tail 9086.064861 0.112447661 238.9636515 0.455281434 1.651254 no 0.007274
Two Tail 9086.064861 0.112447661 238.9636515 0.910562869 1.969939 -18920.7 16877.29 no 0.007274
Table 6. T-test and selected statistics comparing residents and non-residents. The p-value of 0.91 indicates that there is not a 
significant difference between the mean royalties for resident and non-resident landowners. 
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earlier estimates. However, royalties fluctuate with the market and contract terms 
negotiated between wind firm and landowner. Alteration of any of the three key 
components of royalties (CF, royalty rate, and wholesale energy price) will cause the 
average royalty price to fluctuate. This study assumes a CF between 25% and 35%, a 
royalty rate of 4%, and the wholesale energy price to be between $35 and $45 per MWh, 
with all components reflecting current market estimates. However, if the circumstances 
of wind energy production shift, and market conditions were to depress or turbine 
efficiency was suppressed, the average royalty would shift in a similar direction.  
For instance, if the CF was between 20% and 30% instead, and royalty rate and 
wholesale energy price were to remain the same, the average royalty for the study site 
would reduce to $6,196 per turbine per year, with a minimum average royalty of $3,592, 
and a maximum average royalty of $8,261. Instead of $11.5 million, total estimated 
royalties in the two-county study region would be $9.6 million. Since CF is a measure of 
how much electricity the wind turbine actually produces, it becomes extremely 
important for researchers to calculate and establish an accurate CF in situations where 
the economic benefits of wind energy are estimated. One landowner with 104 turbines 
who would usually receive $591,474 in royalties would receive $494,962 under this new 
regime, a 16% reduction overall. In another instance, if the CF and royalty rate were to 
remain constant and the wholesale price of energy was suppressed to between $30 
and$40 per MWh, the average royalty for the study site would decrease to $6,498 per 
turbine per year, with a minimum average royalty of $3,767 and a maximum average 
royalty of $8,664. The total estimated royalty for the study area would be $10.1 million.
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Type Landowners Turbines Royalties Type Landowners Turbines Royalties Landowner Turbines Royalty
Trust 9 83 567,466       Trust 14 82 588,511       23 165 1,155,977 10%
Inc 1 14 90,146         Inc 4 64 427,119       5 78 517,265     4%
LTD 5 113 695,402       LTD 7 68 533,992       12 181 1,229,394 11%
LP 1 19 187,587       LP 2 33 212,487       3 52 400,074     3%
LLC 3 8 67,822         LLC 4 57 463,175       7 65 530,997     5%
Partnership 2 33 224,503       Partnership 1 5 32,195          3 38 256,698     2%
Et al 7 24 167,839       Et al 11 63 419,381       18 87 587,220     5%
Estate 3 9 42,922         Estate 1 1 9,873            4 10 52,795       0.5%
Co 0 0 -                Co 2 60 413,812       2 60 413,812     4%
Family 1 2 12,878         Family 0 0 -                1 2 12,878       0.1%
Total 32 305 2,056,565   46 433 3,100,545    78 738 5,157,110 45%
Percent of total 13% 18% 18% 19% 25% 27% 32% 43% 45% Of total
Residents Non-residents Totals
Table 7. Land tenure breakdown of residents and non –resident turbines and royalties with percentages. 
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The same landowner with 104 turbines would then receive $519,090, a 12% reduction 
overall. Lastly, if the royalty rate was reduced from 4% to 3.9%, and CF and wholesale 
price of energy were constant, the average royalty for the study site would fall to $7,219 
per turbine per year, a 2% reduction. Clearly, CF fluctuation has the highest potential to 
considerably alter estimates of royalty disbursements. On the other hand, CF will 
probably not fluctuate in a way that could affect long-term estimates. If early estimates 
of CF were to be followed (anywhere from 19% to 60%) and other components 
remained constant, the average royalty for the study site would be $10,170. While this 
figure falls in line with the upper limit of royalty estimates, a CF of 60% is highly 
unlikely. Moreover, a larger range for CF will result in royalty values greatly skewed 
toward the high end of estimates.  
Contracts negotiated between landowners and wind firms are generally long-
term, lasting twenty years or more, which is striking when considering long-term 
financial benefits under the current market conditions (i.e. disregarding inflation). If all 
landowners in the study area negotiated a twenty-year contract, the total estimated 
royalty for the study area would be $230,775,380 during the lifetime of the contract. 
This means that the average landowner (turbines=7, royalty=$47,879) could potentially 
receive $957,580 over the period of twenty years under current market conditions. Of 
course, market conditions will fluctuate throughout the period of the contract, and while 
the royalty rate will likely remain unchanged, inflation may cause the wholesale 
electricity price to fluctuate, and weather conditions and maintenance may alter the 
efficiency of the turbines from month to month and year to year.    
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter discusses the implications of the findings in the previous chapter and 
suggestions for future studies on this topic. 
 
The main objectives of this research were to: determine the spatial distribution of 
turbines and royalties, explore the effects of alteration of the contract terms upon royalty 
disbursements, and investigate the socioeconomic impacts of wind energy in the study 
area. Upon inspection of Figure 1 it is immediately apparent that there is a considerable 
disparity between the landowners with turbines and those without in Nolan and Taylor 
Counties; only 241 landowners have turbines on their property, leaving 8,128 non-urban 
landowners without. There may be numerous reasons for this disparity, and among them 
could be: the parcel may be too close to an urban center, the parcel may not be large 
enough to support a turbine or network of turbines, the wind resource is perhaps 
insufficient for siting a turbine, there may already be enough turbines in the area, the 
landowner declined having a turbine on property, or siting more turbines in the area 
might not be cost efficient (i.e. there is already an abundance of energy output, 
transmission lines may be too costly, or turbines may be too expensive). Wind turbines 
seem to be emphatically welcomed in this particular area (New Amsterdam 2008; 
Brannstrom et al. 2011, Jepson et al. 2012, Slattery et al. 2012), so the matter of fervent 
local protest as a possible reason for the absence of turbines on some properties is 
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largely dismissed from consideration. More information is needed to draw conclusions 
about why turbines are on some parcels and not on others. Despite the difficulty in 
determining the reasoning behind the current configuration of turbines, the fact remains 
that only about 3% of non-urban landowners are receiving millions of dollars in royalties 
per year. With no cohesive spatial pattern for siting, since Texas has no regulations 
governing wind siting (Bohn and Lant 2009), landowners with turbines almost appear to 
have been chosen at random. Turbines are grouped into farms on the land and connected 
to the electricity grid, so they exhibit some spatial pattern and grouping, but testing has 
not been performed to determine whether turbine siting is truly randomized. This theme 
has not yet been studied in wind energy literature.  
Additionally, the spatial distribution of royalties amongst the 3% of rural 
landowners is heavily skewed toward the top quintile (see Figure 12 and Table 3); 60% 
of royalties are distributed to 20% of rural landowners. This means that 0.7% of rural 
landowners in Nolan and Taylor Counties are receiving 60% of royalties, and just over 
1% of rural landowners are receiving nearly 80% of all royalties from wind energy. In 
quantifiable terms, this equates to 0.7% receiving $7,017,091 annually, and 1.1% 
receiving $9,146,169 annually. For the bottom quintile, 0.6% of all rural landowners 
receive 3.2% of royalties, or $375,148 annually. This skewed distribution of royalties is 
highly correlated to parcel size (r
2
=0.81); generally, the larger the parcel (or group of 
parcels), the more turbines, and therefore more royalties. The imbalance in the 
distribution of royalties may lead to negative opinions amongst residents or landowners 
who receive no direct financial benefits from the presence of wind energy. Ironically, as 
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several scholars have pointed out, support for wind turbines is very often linked to 
monetary benefits (Pasqualetti 2001; Sowers 2006; Jepson et al. 2012; Slattery et al. 
2012; Mulvaney et al. 2013; Groth and Vogt 2014).   
Evaluation of all rural CAD landowner records for the study area also fails to 
provide a definitive answer about the attractiveness of siting on farmland or ranchland. 
There are forty-one parcels identified as farms or ranches in the tax records in Nolan and 
Taylor Counties, thirteen of which have turbines. However, there are numerous other 
parcels in Nolan and Taylor Counties that are used for farming or ranching but are not 
indicated as such on tax records. Moreover, distinguishing between landowners who 
claim their land as a working farm or ranch on tax records and landowners who have 
land used for farming or ranching but is not delineated as such on tax records would be 
extremely difficult. Most of the rural land in the study area is used for farming and/or 
ranching, so there may be no correlation between land use and turbine siting. Generally, 
the land in northwest Nolan County near Roscoe is used as farmland, and the land in the 
southeast is mainly used as ranchland. The parcels in the northeast are smaller, only 
having room for one or two turbines per parcel and therefore landowners receive small 
royalty payments, whereas parcels in the southwest are larger and have room for several 
more turbines per parcel and therefore landowners receive larger royalty payments. 
However, without definitive information about the land use of each parcel, it would be 
impossible to draw a reasonable conclusion about the distribution of royalties to farmers 
and/or ranchers, or whether any preference is given to one or the other in turbine siting. 
It has been stated that land uses such as farming or ranching are ideal for wind turbines 
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because they utilize minimal space on the land, close the gap with otherwise volatile rent 
payments, and increase crop yield (Pasqualetti 2001; Sowers 2006; New Amsterdam 
2008; Abbott 2010). However, there have been no quantitative studies to date that have 
investigated whether ranchland or farmland is preferential in siting decisions. Worth 
noting, on the other hand, in Brannstrom et al. (2011) and Jepson et al. (2012), is the 
statement by a respondent that “the difference between ranchers and farmers with wind 
turbines on their property is about two or three decimal places. Some ranchers have 
turbines producing over 100 megawatts on their property, whereas most farmers have 
turbines producing three megawatts.” This theme could benefit from further inquiry in 
future studies.   
Another concern in this study is that there is a “leakage” of royalties out of the 
two-county area for non-resident landowners, which has not previously been studied. 
Although just over half (54%) of landowners with turbines are residents of Nolan or 
Taylor County, only 53% of royalties are distributed to landowners with local addresses. 
The non-resident landowners are broken down into two groups: those landowners who 
reside in Texas and those who reside outside of Texas. The non-resident landowners 
residing outside of Texas collect 7% of total royalties and 15% of non-resident royalties, 
whereas non-residents residing in Texas collect 40% of total royalties and 85% of non-
resident royalties. It is important to note that though some non-resident landowners still 
live inside Nolan or Taylor Counties, they are labeled as non-residents because they live 
outside the driving distance or time range established in the previous chapters. The 
thresholds set for this study do not provide a conclusive answer about whether 
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landowners are residents or not, but they do provide a reasonable estimate about 
landowner location based on tax addresses. If royalties for residents of Nolan and Taylor 
Counties are added to royalties for non-residents with tax addresses in Nolan and Taylor, 
$7,086,950 or ~61% of total royalties is shown to stay in the two-county area. Clearly, 
while the “leakage” of royalties out of the study area seems drastic, the community is 
still able to reap most benefits from the establishment of wind farms nearby.  
Alteration of the terms of the contract between landowners and wind firms is one 
of the keystones of this research since the royalty estimation formula utilized here is an 
approximation of actual royalties distributed. Other researchers have estimated royalties 
to be anywhere between $2,000 and $10,000 per turbine per year (Pasqualetti 2004; 
Sowers 2006; Pasqualetti 2011, Blair 2012; Ellis 2012) because variables like CF or 
wholesale energy price were approximated too high or low, or inflation was not 
accounted for. Owing to the confidential nature of the contracts, the royalty calculations 
can only be estimated. New Amsterdam (2008) provides reasonable estimates for CF, 
revenue, and royalty rate, which have been adjusted for inflation in this research. When 
these three variables fluctuate independently, they have various effects on the overall 
average estimated royalty: altering CF has the most impact on the overall average, 
followed by revenue, then royalty rate when CF is varied by 5%, revenue is varied by 
$5/MWh, and royalty rate is varied by 0.1%. This indicates that annual total mean 
estimated royalties for Nolan and Taylor Counties fluctuate by 16% using current 
estimates, and by extension, long-term estimates will vary proportionately. Moreover, 
long-term ramifications of royalty disbursements have essentially been ignored in the 
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literature. Many landowners signed 20-year contracts, and as a result, the average 
landowner receiving $47,879 annually in royalties would receive $957,580 during the 
lifetime of the contract without adjustments for inflation. Some landowners may have 
negotiated for a higher rate than others when contracts were signed, consequently, some 
landowners may receive more royalties than others despite having signed a contract at 
the same time for turbines from the same wind farm.  
Social perspectives and social acceptance are pivotal parts of wind energy 
research. Most studies conducted about wind power in the last three decades have 
focused on its social facets, up to and including how benefits have affected acceptance 
levels, yet, few studies have been conducted discussing the link between social 
acceptance and royalties. Several authors mention in passing that “benefits” (Pasqualetti 
2001; Cowell et al. 2011; Slattery et al. 2012; Groth and Vogt 2014), “financial 
compensation” (Mulvaney et al.  2013), or “incentives” (Sovacool and Ratan 2012) are 
associated with acceptance, but most importantly, Jepson et al. (2012) indicate that there 
is a connection between support for wind energy and “economic benefits” in this study 
area. Numerous researchers have examined how public opinion could be influenced by 
disbursement of benefits, but research is scarce on how disbursement of benefits 
influences public opinion. Despite some protest, acceptance levels for wind power are 
generally high, but why do so many landowners support wind power if so few are 
receiving direct financial benefits? Many studies ignore how royalties matter when 
discussing social acceptance or opinions regarding wind power, disregarding the 
reasoning behind high levels of acceptance. It is possible that respondents classified as 
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“wind welcomers” in both Brannstrom et al. (2011) and Jepson et al. (2012) most likely 
“love the wind” because they receive royalties or know someone who does. One’s 
viewpoint of wind power (or any renewable energy source) likely depends on economic 
factors, therefore more research should be conducted to investigate the idea of royalties 
as the impetus for social acceptance.        
This research has its limitations in that it does not seek to determine how 
royalties are spent, but merely the approximate volume and destination of royalties. 
Future studies may advance this topic by determining how landowners use their royalties 
and whether royalties influence landowner decision-making or spending. For instance, 
are landowners using royalties for farm operations, investing in other businesses, 
reserves in the form of a trust fund, or paying down debt? Do royalties influence debt 
reduction, land-use decision-making, or urban businesses? Are community businesses 
prospering because more revenue is available in the local economy? Are landowners 
without turbines also reaping benefits?   
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter discusses the implications of the findings in the previous chapters, 
considers broader issues, and provides suggestions for future studies on this topic. 
 
Wind energy royalties are distributed to a small percentage of the population in 
Nolan and Taylor Counties, and a small fraction of that population receives the majority 
of royalties. Two-fifths of the landowners with turbines do not reside in the county 
where turbines are sited, and nearly half of royalties are distributed to non-residents, but 
there is no statistical difference between mean resident and non-resident royalties. 
Furthermore, there is no discernible pattern in which turbines are arranged on the 
landscape other than avoidance of urban areas and major transportation routes. Ranchers 
appear to be favored over farmers for royalties, however, ranchland is usually larger than 
farmland and can support more turbines, though more data is required to determine 
conclusively whether one sub-region is preferred over another. The variable established 
as the principal determinant of mean estimated royalties in this study was capacity 
factor, followed by revenue, and then royalty rate. Nevertheless, not all contracts are 
created equally, and some landowners may receive more royalties than others since 
individual landowners negotiate contract terms with wind firms. For this reason, royalty 
estimates in this study are necessarily approximations. Above all, this research has 
highlighted the disparity between rural landowners with turbines and those without in 
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addition to the disparity between the wealthiest two-fifths of rural landowners with 
turbines and all other rural landowners.          
The existing literature regarding royalties for wind energy does not take into 
account that royalties may be one of the main reasons for social acceptance. 
Alternatively, most literature has deliberated over factors that may increase social 
acceptance, including cooperative decision-making, incentive programs, or financial 
benefits, mostly in reference to the approach to cessation of protests for the early stages 
of wind development. Further investigation of the socioeconomic dynamics of the area 
should be completed to discover the motivation behind landowner acceptance of and 
support for wind energy despite few landowners actually receiving royalties. Fairness in 
benefit distribution is appears not to be a concern amongst the majority of residents in 
Nolan and Taylor Counties. Why do residents without turbines (more than 90%) still 
welcome the wind? Royalties may have more far-reaching benefits than the obvious, 
immediate benefits received by landowners with turbines. Are residents without turbines 
reaping benefits other than royalties? Many scholars have already studied the 
employment impacts, tax impacts, and real estate impacts of wind energy and 
determined that the effects are widespread. There may be some factor not yet studied 
that also benefits all landowners. What other factors can help explain why wind power is 
so popular in this region? Extended, comprehensive studies could provide the answers to 
these questions through the use of personal interviews and extensive investigation of tax 
records along with the examination of other sources of wealth in the area (e.g. oil or 
natural gas).  
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The findings herein add some transparency to the existing literature on royalties 
and contract terms, identifying variables, clarifying estimates, and facilitating the 
understanding of individual benefits. The new element introduced is the spatial element 
of royalty distributions, which has not previously been examined in the literature. More 
can be expounded on and understood from this new facet of wind energy research which 
is in its infancy.            
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APPENDIX A 
  
Units Power Capacity
# MW MW/unit 25% 35% CF = 25 CF = 35 CF = 25 CF = 35 CF = 25 CF = 35
Buffalo Gap 67 120.6 1.80 30.15 42.21 264,114 369,760 9,243,990 12,941,586 11,885,130 16,639,182
Buffalo Gap 3 74 170.2 2.30 42.55 59.57 372,738 521,833 13,045,830 18,264,162 16,773,210 23,482,494
Buffalo Gap II 155 232.5 1.50 58.125 81.375 509,175 712,845 17,821,125 24,949,575 22,912,875 32,078,025
Callahan Divide Wind Energy Center 76 114.0 1.50 28.5 39.9 249,660 349,524 8,738,100 12,233,340 11,234,700 15,728,580
Champion (Roscoe II) 54 124.2 2.30 31.05 43.47 271,998 380,797 9,519,930 13,327,902 12,239,910 17,135,874
Horse Hollow II 129 296.7 2.30 74.175 103.845 649,773 909,682 22,742,055 31,838,877 29,239,785 40,935,699
Horse Hollow Wind Energy Center 292 438.0 1.50 109.5 153.3 959,220 1,342,908 33,572,700 47,001,780 43,164,900 60,430,860
Inadale (Roscoe IV) 148 148.0 1.00 37 51.8 324,120 453,768 11,344,200 15,881,880 14,585,400 20,419,560
Roscoe 100 100.0 1.00 25 35 219,000 306,600 7,665,000 10,731,000 9,855,000 13,797,000
South Trent Mesa 43 98.9 2.30 24.725 34.615 216,591 303,227 7,580,685 10,612,959 9,746,595 13,645,233
Sweetwater 176 264.0 1.50 66 92.4 578,160 809,424 20,235,600 28,329,840 26,017,200 36,424,080
Sweetwater #4a 136 136.0 1.00 34 47.6 297,840 416,976 10,424,400 14,594,160 13,402,800 18,763,920
Sweetwater #4b 46 105.8 2.30 26.45 37.03 231,702 324,383 8,109,570 11,353,398 10,426,590 14,597,226
Sweetwater 5 35 80.5 2.30 20.125 28.175 176,295 246,813 6,170,325 8,638,455 7,933,275 11,106,585
Trent Mesa Wind Farm 101 151.5 1.50 37.875 53.025 331,785 464,499 11,612,475 16,257,465 14,930,325 20,902,455
Turkey Track 113 169.5 1.50 42.375 59.325 371,205 519,687 12,992,175 18,189,045 16,704,225 23,385,915
1,745  2750.4 687.6 962.64 6,023,376 9,695,612 210,818,160 295,145,424 271,051,920 379,472,688
Capacity Factor MWh/yr [8760 hrs/yr] Total Revenue [$35/MWh] Total Revenue [$45/MWh]
Appendix figure A.1. First half of royalty calculation chart for turbines in Nolan and Taylor Counties. 
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CF = 25 CF = 35 CF = 25 CF = 35 CF = 25 CF = 35 CF = 25 CF = 35 Low High Avg
369,760 517,663 5,519 7,726 475,405 665,567 7,096 9,934 5,519 9,934 7,726 Buffalo Gap
521,833 730,566 7,052 9,873 670,928 939,300 9,067 12,693 7,052 12,693 9,873 Buffalo Gap 3
712,845 997,983 4,599 6,439 916,515 1,283,121 5,913 8,278 4,599 8,278 6,439 Buffalo Gap II
349,524 489,334 4,599 6,439 449,388 629,143 5,913 8,278 4,599 8,278 6,439 Callahan Divide Wind Energy Center
380,797 533,116 7,052 9,873 489,596 685,435 9,067 12,693 7,052 12,693 9,873 Champion (Roscoe II)
909,682 1,273,555 7,052 9,873 1,169,591 1,637,428 9,067 12,693 7,052 12,693 9,873 Horse Hollow II
1,342,908 1,880,071 4,599 6,439 1,726,596 2,417,234 5,913 8,278 4,599 8,278 6,439 Horse Hollow Wind Energy Center
453,768 635,275 3,066 4,292 583,416 816,782 3,942 5,519 3,066 5,519 4,292 Inadale (Roscoe IV)
306,600 429,240 3,066 4,292 394,200 551,880 3,942 5,519 3,066 5,519 4,292 Roscoe
303,227 424,518 7,052 9,873 389,864 545,809 9,067 12,693 7,052 12,693 9,873 South Trent Mesa
809,424 1,133,194 4,599 6,439 1,040,688 1,456,963 5,913 8,278 4,599 8,278 6,439 Sweetwater
416,976 583,766 3,066 4,292 536,112 750,557 3,942 5,519 3,066 5,519 4,292 Sweetwater #4a
324,383 454,136 7,052 9,873 417,064 583,889 9,067 12,693 7,052 12,693 9,873 Sweetwater #4b
246,813 345,538 7,052 9,873 317,331 444,263 9,067 12,693 7,052 12,693 9,873 Sweetwater 5
464,499 650,299 4,599 6,439 597,213 836,098 5,913 8,278 4,599 8,278 6,439 Trent Mesa Wind Farm
519,687 727,562 4,599 6,439 668,169 935,437 5,913 8,278 4,599 8,278 6,439 Turkey Track
8,432,726 11,805,817 5,289 7,404 10,842,077 15,178,908 6,800 9,520 3,066 12,693 Avg
1,557 2,180 2,002 2,803 1,557 2,803 Stdev
7,404
Low: Total Revenue [$35/MWh] High: Total Revenue [$45/MWh]
Gross Royalty [4%] Royalty/unit Gross Royalty [4%] Royalty/unit
Appendix figure A.2. Second half of royalty calculation chart for turbines in Nolan and Taylor Counties. 
